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1 Introduction
The failure of a single financial institution has the potential to spark catastrophic
losses in local, regional, and global financial systems. The global financial crisis which
unfolded in 2008 has provided an example. In order to prevent a potential meltdown of
the financial system, the US government was prompted to save large financial institutions
at the onset of this crisis. The intervention activities lead to debates in support and
objection of rescuing certain distressed financial institutions. Arguments in favour stress
that financial institutions receiving government support are systemically important. That
is, their failure may trigger a relatively large number of simultaneous failures within
the financial sector. Nevertheless, the institutions that in practice receive most, if not
all, the “bailout” attention are large firms. In other words, although bailouts should
be conducted for “systemically important financial institutions” (SIFIs), the practical
principle is simply to rescue firms that are “Too big to fail” (TBTF). This suggests that
large financial institutions are automatically SIFIs. However, such an assertion is lacking
a careful empirical examination. This is the first question this paper addresses: Is size
fundamental in characterizing the systemic importance of a financial institution? If size
is not the sole determinant in differentiating banks’ systemic importance, the consequent
question is then: what are the other major bank-level characteristics that determine the
systemic importance of a financial institution? To answer these questions, this paper
empirically analyzes potential determinants of banks’ systemic importance.
We distinguish the concept of systemic importance from systemic risk. The term
systemic risk has been used in a number of different contexts, and does not yet have a
rigorous singular definition. It sometimes refers to the system-wide risk in the financial
sector1 and sometimes refers to the contribution to the system-wide risk by one single
institution.2 The former can be regarded as the aggregation of the latter across all
institutions in the system. Conceptually, a financial institution may contribute to the
1Acharya et al. (2009) define systemic risk as “the risk of a crisis in the financial sector and its
spill-over to the economy”.
2De Bandt and Hartmann (2000) define systemic risk contribution as “the risk of experiencing an
event such that the release of bad information on, or failure of, one institution propagates across the
system resulting in further failures of other institutions”.
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system-wide risk through their individual riskiness and through the potential of their
own distress to inflict losses to other banks in the financial system. It is here that we
delineate our separation of systemic risk from systemic importance. Our definition of
the term systemic importance refers to the impact of a single bank’s distress or failure
to the rest of the system, excluding the likelihood or impact of the failure itself. This
definition is consistent with the view of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
(BCBS) which stresses that “systemic importance should be measured in terms of the
impact that a failure of a bank can have on the global financial system and wider economy
rather than the risk that a failure can occur.”3
With the definition of systemic importance, the TBTF refers to a positive relation
between size and systemic importance. It can be supported by theoretical arguments
on diversification. A well diversified bank bears less individual risks, while at the same
time, due to large common exposure, it is more systemically connected to the rest of the
system; see e.g. Wagner (2010) and Ibragimov et al. (2011). In addition, there is empirical
evidence that large banks implement superior diversification strategies, see, e.g. Demsetz
and Strahan (1997). Therefore, larger banks may be more systemically important due
to diversification. Similarly, the diversification argument can be well applied to explain
why other bank characteristics can be potentially associated with systemic importance.
We consider two type of activities in this paper.
First, we argue that banking activities generating non-interest income may be asso-
ciated with systemic importance. With financial innovation, financial institutions have
the opportunity to participate in non-interest profit generating processes, such as se-
curitization and derivatives trading. Such banking activities increase diversification by
permitting access to different markets. As average levels of diversification rise across the
financial system, banks engaging in these activities will hold increasingly similar posi-
tions. Consequently, this enhances the possibility that financial institutions will suffer
from common shocks to the asset side of their balance sheets. This is in accordance with
the so-called indirect linkages in the systemic risk literature, see, e.g. de Vries (2005)
3See BCBS press release, “Global systemically important banks: Assessment methodology and the
additional loss absorbency requirement”, November 2011.
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and Acharya (2009). Therefore, banks that participate in non-interest profit generating
activities have the potential to be more systemically important.
Second, increased reliance on non-core funding channels such as the money market
may be associated with greater systemic importance. Traditional funding sources such as
retail deposits are localized and are therefore subject to regional idiosyncratic shocks or
runs, see, e.g., Diamond and Dybvig (1983). In order to mitigate such risks, banks form
funding relationships with other banks through the interbank lending market. These
relationships can be viewed as liability claims as insurance against uncorrelated idiosyn-
cratic liquidity shocks.4 However, such interbank relationships may not be able to insure
against systemic shocks (Allen and Gale (2000)), and may on the contrary expose the
system to possible contagion, see, e.g. Gai and Kapadia (2010). In other words, the dis-
tress of one bank leads to successive distress of other institutions, see, e.g. Brunnermeier
and Pedersen (2009), Allen and Carletti (2008). Therefore, banks that are more exposed
to the interbank market are potentially more systemically important.
To summarize, if the diversification argument supports the statement of “TBTF”, it
may also support the statement that engaging in non-interest profit generating activities
and accessing interbank funding may be associated with systemic importance. These
activities can be regarded as alternative methods for diversifying asset side or funding side
risk. In contrast, banking activities that generate interest income or rely on retail funding
sources fall into the category of specialized banking. Although engaging in specialized
activities may lead to higher individual risk, such banks are less linked to the rest of the
system, and are consequently less systemically important.
We label the banking activities enhancing diversification as non-traditional banking
activities and predict that non-traditional banking activities are associated with high
systemic importance. In other words, instead of being TBTF, banks may well be “Too
non-traditional to fail” (TNTTF). Based on these theoretical arguments, this paper is
4When individual banks face privately observed liquidity shocks that are imperfectly correlated across
financial institutions, these same institutions find it optimal to co-insure each other through an interbank
exchange of liquidity in the form of deposits (Freixas et al. (2000)). Therefore, during benign states of
the economy, the interbank payment apparatus serves to stabilize the financial system by providing and
transferring liquidity across financial institutions (Goodfriend and King (1988)).
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devoted to test the TBTF and TNTTF notions. More specifically, we test whether
large bank size or high levels of engagement in non-interest income generating and non-
traditional funding are associated with higher levels of systemic importance.
For our empirical purpose, we construct a measure on banks’ systemic importance
based on its theoretical interpretation. More specifically, our systemic importance mea-
sure is defined as the expected loss to the financial system given that one institution has
failed. Thus, we refer to our measure as the “expected systemic loss” (ESL). Given the
failure of the underlying institution, the expected loss to the financial system is mea-
sured by the sum of expected losses of other institutions in the system. The systemic
importance measures derived thereof give insight on the potential social welfare effects of
a particular bank failure without reflecting the likelihood or impact of the failure of the
underlying bank.
Comparing with existing measures on systemic risk of financial institutions,5 our
measure differs in at least three aspects. First, we do not attempt to measure the system-
wide risk on an aggregate level. Rather, we implement a firm-level measure in order to
analyze cross-sectional differences in systemic importance. Essentially, our measure is
neither a measure of current system-wide risk nor a predictor of future crisis. It serves
solely as an indicator of the relative importance of each institution. Second, our measure
focuses on systemic importance which does not contain information on the individual
riskiness of the underlying institution. This reflects the concept of systemic importance
as aforementioned. As such, the measure does not intend to be additive towards an
overall level of system-wide risk. Our measure is thus distinguished from measures on
systemic risk contribution.6 Third, we implement a multivariate extreme value theory
(EVT) approach in estimating our proposed measure. Multivariate EVT, as a modern
statistical tool for handling tail events, has been employed for systemic risk evaluation,
see, e.g. Hartmann et al. (2007) and Zhou (2010).
5For measures on systemic risk, various prominent candidates are present in the literature, see, e.g.
Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011), Acharya et al. (2010), Segoviano and Goodhart (2009), Huang et al.
(2012), and Brownlees and Engle (2012).
6Additivity is a usual requirement for measures on systemic risk contribution; see e.g. Tarashev et al.
(2010).
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Our first major finding is that size, to a large extent, is able to differentiate systemic
importance. Nevertheless, banks’ systemic importance is increasing in size only up to a
certain limit. For US banks during the crisis period (2007–2010) large banks are more
systemically important (i.e., TBTF holds), but only for banks with total assets below
100 billion USD. The systemic importance of banks with total assets exceeding this
threshold are indifferent.7 Hence, differentiating the systemic importance of banks by
only analyzing size is not sufficient for large US banks. It is thus necessary to investigate
other potential determinants for both large and small banks.
With a close examination of indicators on banks’ business models, our second major
finding is that, in addition to size, systemic importance is also determined by how much
a bank relies on non-core funding to fund its projects and the amount of non-interest
income generating activities. On the time dimension, our analysis on a selection of US
banks over a decade long period shows that the determinants of systemic importance
vary over time.
Lastly, we provide evidence that bank activities that serve to differentiate systemic
importance have an opposite effect on banks’ individual riskiness. Specifically, banks that
search out traditional sources of funding and income generating activities, generally have
a higher individual risk with a lower systemic importance. This evidence support the
diversification explanation on why banks engaging in non-traditional banking activities
are associated with high systemic importance.
The paper proceeds as follows. We discuss our measure of systemic importance in
Section 2. Section 3 describes data and our empirical strategy. The empirical results
are reported in Section 4. Section 5 compares the determinants of systemic importance
with that of individual risk. Section 6 presents the results on several robustness checks.
Section 7 concludes the paper and provides a discussion on possible policy implications.
7According to the Statistical Releases of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 19
US commercial banks had total assets exceeding 100 billion USD as of June 30, 2013.
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2 Measuring Systemic Importance
We propose a measure on systemic importance which reflects the economic impact
given the failure of a specific bank. We illustrate this idea by first recalling the expected
loss in a single bank context. The expected loss (EL) of a bank given its default is
measured as
EL = PD · LGD · EAD,
where PD is the probability of default, EAD is the exposure at default, and LGD is
the loss given default, measured as the fraction of loss to EAD. The EL is used by
regulators to estimate the credit risk of a bank over a specific period (usually one-year).
Analogously, we intend to estimate the expected loss to the system (ESL) given the failure
of bank i as
ESLi = E(Loss in other banks|Di),
where Di indicates the default of bank i. More specifically, with denoting the loss to
bank j as Lj, we have that
ESLi =
∑
j 6=i
E(Lj|Di) =
∑
j 6=i
Pr(Dj|Di) · LGDj · EADj. (2.1)
Here we assume that LGDj is independent of the failure event Di. We further assume
that the LGDj is constant across all banks in our sample. Therefore, for a cross-sectional
comparison, we can assume LGDj = 1 without loss of generality.
A direct estimation of the probability of joint failure is difficult due to the scarcity of
actual “bank failures”. We resolve this issue by applying multivariate EVT. Instead of
estimating the conditional probability of joint failures, the EVT approach proxies that by
estimating conditional probability of joint bank distresses. The fundamental idea behind
multivariate EVT is that the dependence across extremely rare events can be represented
by observed data in the tail of the distribution; see e.g. De Haan and Ferreira (2006,
Chapter 6) for an overview of multivariate EVT. In this way, the conditional probability
of joint default can be approximated by the conditional probability of joint distress.
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We describe a distress event as occurring when the market price of a bank’s equity
experiences a large loss. Evidence suggests that financial market data, such as a bank’s
market price of equity, can serve as an early warning indicator of ratings changes for
publicly traded bank holding companies (BHCs), see, e.g. Krainer and Lopez (2003).
Therefore, we analyze the co-movement of distress events in equity prices, which provides
a good proxy for the conditional probability of joint failure.
Consider a banking system consisting of N banks. Denote their equity returns as
X1, . . . , XN . A distress, or tail event, is defined as an event with a low probability p.
8
In other words, a tail event for bank i with probability p occurs if of Xi falls below
the Value-at-Risk (VaR) of the bank defined by Pr(Xi < −V aRi(p)) = p. Although the
choice of p is of concern for regulators and the internal risk management of the firm, we
do not impose a specific p level here. Instead, we consider an equivalent p level across
firms. Notice that this does not imply that the threshold levels are identical across firms,
but rather that the probability of a tail event is identical. Certain firms have a greater
loss tolerance than others can thus enjoy a lower threshold for defining a tail event. Such
a description allows for heterogeneity in banks’ individual risk taking activities.
With assuming LGDj = 1 and using Xi < −V aRi(p) to represent the distress event,
we rewrite (2.1) as
ESLi =
∑
j 6=i
EADj · Pr(Xj < −V aRj(p)|Xi < −V aRi(p)). (2.2)
Lastly, we use the amount of total custom deposits to proxy the EAD measure. This
choice deviates from the usual practice in the literature, i.e. using bank’s total liabilities,9
because we intend to capture the social welfare loss given bank defaults. During a period
of economic turmoil, when an acquisition of a failed bank by a competitor is not feasible,
the government, or monetary authority, is facing a decision of whether or not to rescue
the bank from bankruptcy using public funds. If the authority decides, following the
8For instance, a p of 0.001, using daily data, corresponds to a tail event once per 1/p = 1000 days,
or about once per 4 years.
9As a robustness check in Section 6.2, we do use total liabilities of each bank to proxy the EAD
measure. In this way, we measure the expected loss to the system given a bank failure in terms of loss on
all deposits, not just those insured by the central authority. The results remain qualitatively unchanged.
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failure of a bank, not to provide any bailout to the other banks that fail in conjunction,
they are responsible for the insured customer deposits held by the other failed banks.
Without having a large cross-section of data on the size of insured deposits held by
banks, we assume that the fraction of insured deposits against total customer deposits is
comparable across banks. With this assumption, for a cross-sectional comparison on the
ESL, we can thus use the amount of total customer deposits as the proxy of the EAD
measure without loss of generality.
Different from the emerging literature on measuring systemic risk, few studies have
focused solely on the systemic importance. Tarashev et al. (2010) explore a systemic
importance measure with utilizing the concept of the Shapley value in game theory.
Drehmann and Tarashev (2013) apply this measure to empirically assess systemic impor-
tance of individual institutions. The potential downside of the Shapley value approach
is that it requires a large amount of computational effort which puts a burden on its
empirical application to a large financial system. Another measure of systemic impor-
tance related to this study is the Systemic Impact Index (SII) in Zhou (2010). In fact,
our proposed ESL measure can be considered as a generalization of this simple counting
measure. Differently, we further account for the economic impact to the system given the
failure of one single institution.
3 Data and Methodology
3.1 Estimating the ESL
The key element in estimating the ESL measure is the estimation of the conditional
probability that bank j fails given that bank i fails for each pair i and j. For that purpose,
daily equity prices on US bank holding companies (BHCs) from 2000 to 2010 are collected
from Datastream.10 We follow Hartmann et al. (2007) to estimate such the conditional
probability by applying multivariate extreme value statistics.
Multivariate extreme value statistics improves upon existing methodology in the fol-
10Equities selected are traded on both the NYSE and the NASDAQ exchanges.
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lowing way. Firstly, most existing measure of systemic risk use a statistical methodology
that assumes multivariate normality. In contrast, there is a great deal of empirical evi-
dence to suggest that financial data follow a fat-tailed distribution; see, e.g. Mandelbrot
(1963). Therefore, methodologies incorporating a normality assumption tend to underes-
timate the probability of extreme events. Secondly, the multivariate normal distribution
is known to exhibit tail independence, see, e.g. Sibuya (1959), while financial data have
non-negligible tail dependence. Lastly, since systemic risk or systemic importance is
about tail events, only the tail region should be considered in the estimation. Fitting
data to a full parametric distribution usually results in estimates which are determined
by moderate level data. Such an estimated distribution may not represent the tail co-
movements. To conclude, the applying multivariate extreme value statistics allows for
both heavy-tails and tail dependence, and it focuses on the observations in the tail region
only while ignoring the observations at the moderate level.11
The maintained assumption in our multivariate EVT approach is that the limit of the
conditional probability of joint distress exists, i.e. as p→ 0,
τi,j := lim
p→0
Pr(Xj < −V aRj(p)|Xi < −V aRi(p)).
Thus, the conditional probability of joint distress can be approximated by its limit τi,j.
Suppose we have n observations on the two return series as (Xi,s, Xj,s) for 1 ≤ s ≤ n.
The limit τi,j can be estimated by taking p = k/n for an intermediate sequence k := k(n)
such that k(n) → ∞ and k(n)/n → 0 as n → ∞. A non-parametric estimate of τi,j is
then given as
τˆi,j :=
1
k
n∑
s=1
1Xj,s<Xj,(n−k),Xi,s<Xi,(n−k) , (3.1)
11As an illustration of how the techniques of EVT improve upon the methods that impose a normality
assumption, we consider the analysis of two banks, Wells Fargo and Bank of America as in. We use daily
returns of the two banks from the beginning of 1995 to the end of 2010 (i.e. 4175 observations). We
assume that distress occurs with a probability of 1%. With such a definition the conditional probability
of joint distress can be estimated non-perimetrically from the data at 59.5%. By fitting the returns of
both banks to a bivariate normal distribution the conditional probability of distress is estimated to be
0.16%. By using the EVT technique the conditional probability of distress is estimated to be 51.2%. It
is clear that the approach incorporating a normality assumption severely underestimates the conditional
probability of joint distress, while the EVT approach provides a more reliable estimate. This result is
robust to different selections of bank pairs.
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where Xi,(n−k) is the (k + 1)th lowest return among Xi,1, . . . , Xi,n.12
In estimating a similar conditional probability in the SII measure, Zhou (2010) uses
the raw equity returns to form the data set on (Xi,s, Xj,s). Such an approach does not take
into account the fact that the co-movement among bank equity returns is partially due to
common systematic risk factors, such as the market factor. Although the systematic risk
might be a source of systemic risk, we aim to measure the systemic link across banks in
other channels. Therefore, using the raw returns to estimate the conditional probability
may result in an upward bias.
We choose to remove the common systematic risk factors and analyze the co-
movements of idiosyncratic returns. In this way, we look the potential for banks to
simultaneously face distresses in the absence of large macroeconomic fluctuations. In
assuming a parsimonious single market factor model, we calculate the residual equity
returns over the market return13 by estimating a single-factor market model in each
estimation period as
Ri,s = αi + βiRm,s + i,s,
where the error terms, i,s, are assumed to follow the standard assumptions of an Ordinary
Least Squared (OLS) regression. The excess returns are then calculated from
ˆi,s = Ri,s − αˆi − βˆiRm,s.
We use the estimated excess returns (ˆi,s, ˆj,s) instead of raw returns as the dataset on
(Xi,s, Xj,s) in the estimation of the conditional probabilities.
14
A remaining technical issue in the estimation is the choice of the intermediate sequence
k in (3.1). The theoretical conditions on k are not relevant for a finite sample analysis.
Instead of taking an arbitrary k, a usual procedure is to calculate the estimator of τi,j
under different k values and draw a line-plot of the estimates against the k values. With
12For the estimator of τi,j , usual statistical properties, such as consistency and asymptotic normality,
has been proved under mild conditions, see, e.g. De Haan and Ferreira (2006, Chapter 7).
13The market returns for the period 2000–2010 refers to the returns of the S&P 500 index.
14In Section 6.1, we run a robustness analysis using raw returns in our calculations. The results do
not change qualitatively.
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a low k value, the estimation exhibits a large variance, while for a high k value, since the
estimation uses too many observations from the moderate level, it bears a potential bias.
Therefore, k is usually chosen by picking the first stable part of the line-plot starting from
low k, which balances the tradeoff between the variance and the bias. The estimates then
follow from such a choice of k. Because k is chosen from a stable part of the line-plot,
a small variation of the k value does not change the estimated value. Thus, the exact k
value is not sensitive for the estimation of τi,j. In our empirical application, the chosen k
value differs for different pairs of banks, because the sample size n, the number of available
excess returns in a given period, differs for different pairs of banks. Nevertheless, we keep
the ratio k/n constant across different samples at a level of 3%.
The estimation of the conditional probability following (3.1) always yields a positive
value even if the actual τi,j is equal to zero. This is a potential estimation bias. Ledford
and Tawn (1997) provide a method to distinguish tail dependence (τ > 0) from tail
independence (τ = 0). Bosma et al. (2012) apply a bootstrapping technique to distinguish
between these two possibilities. For simplicity, we arbitrarily impose a cutoff value of 0.10
in the estimation, such that values of the estimated τ below the cutoff level are set to
zero, in order to avoid the potential positive bias in the estimation of τ .
We estimate the conditional probability of joint distress in estimation windows con-
sisting of daily observations for four years. The choice of having a four year period for
our analysis is to ensure a sufficient number of observations for applying the multivariate
extreme value statistics. Correspondingly, we use average total customer deposits over
the same period as the EAD measure. For that purpose, we collect annual balance sheet
data for each bank from the Bankscope database in 2000–2010.15 With all the estimated
components, the ESL measure for each bank is then calculated according to (2.2).
3.2 Analyzing Potential Determinants
To analyze the potential determinants of systemic importance, we collect bank balance
sheet data in 1999–2006, construct indicators reflecting bank business models and perform
15Equity and balance sheet accounting data are matched between the BvD Bankscope and Datastream
by using the corresponding Bankscope number for each firm.
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a cross-sectional regression analysis between the ESL measure and the indicators.
First, the size of a bank is measured by the logarithm of total assets in millions of
USD. To capture a possible non-linear property of the size, we also consider its quadratic
form in regressions.16
Second, to measure non-traditional banking activities, we consider the following vari-
ables: money market funding as a ratio of total funding and non-interest income as a
ratio of total income. The latter is further decomposed into two variables representing
trading income and fee and commission income both as a ratio of total income.
Lastly, five control variables based on the CAMEL rating system17 are constructed:
• Capital adequacy: Tier 1 Capital Ratio
• Asset quality: Gross Loans/ Total Assets
• Management: Problem Loans/ Total Loans
• Earnings: Return on Average Assets (RoAA)
• Liquidity: Liquid Assets/ Short-term Funding
We conduct our regression analysis in two ways. First, we analyse only the period
between 2007 and 2010 which encapsulates the financial crisis. We filter out any insti-
tution that is not actively traded (i.e. a zero return) on at least 80% of the days within
this period. We match the estimated ESL measure with the annual balance sheet data
recorded at the end of the year in 2006. After this filtering procedure, 311 BHCs are
included in our regression analysis. Since the business model indicators are ahead of the
ESL measure in time, our regression analysis has a “forward-looking” flavor. This allows
analyzing the relation between the business model of a bank before the financial crisis
and its systemic importance during the crisis.
16In order to avoid a potential multi-collinearity issue, the size is first standardized by its cross-
sectional mean and standard deviation at end of each year and then squared.
17The acronym “CAMEL” refers to five components used in order to assess the overall condition and
supervisory rating of a bank. Hirtle and Lopez (1999) find that past CAMEL ratings contain useful
information on the future performance and condition of a bank.
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Second, in order to see whether the drivers of systemic importance stand over a longer
time horizon, we extend our analysis to cover a decade long period from 2000 to 2010.
Under this approach, the ESL measure is estimated in the each four-year window that
is rolled forward year by year in the sample, i.e. the ESL measures are estimated for
the periods 2000–2003, 2001–2004, ..., 2007–2010. We remove any bank that was not
traded on at least 90% of the days covering the whole period 2000–2010 and did not
have end-of-year balance sheet data from 1999 to 2006. This filtering process results in
a panel data set consisting of 143 banks over eight estimation periods. With the 1125
firm-period observations in total, we perform a panel regression with time fixed effects
while the stardard error is calculated with clustering at the bank level.18
4 Empirical Results
4.1 Results in the Financial Crisis Period: 2007–2010
Our main result is conducted over the most recent period in our data set (2007–2010),
which manifests the time surrounding the financial crisis. Table 1 provides descriptive
statistics of the ESL and the potential determinants in this period. Table 2 shows the
correlation among the potential determinants.
Table 3 reports our OLS regression results. The first regression (column 1) only con-
tains one independent variable: size. It is positive and significant at the 99% confidence
level. This result gives support to the TBTF argument that larger banks are more sys-
temically important. We then take a close look at size in the second regression (column
2) by adding its quadratic form. While the level of the size variable remains positive and
significant at the 99% level, the quadratic term is negative and significant at the same
confidence level. Hence, the relation between the ESL and size is non-linear.
In order to have a better insight on the non-linearity, we further analyse the quadratic
18In the robustness check in Section 6.3, we split the panel data set to perform eight separate OLS
regressions in each period. This allows us to check how the determinants have emerged over this decade.
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relation between ESL and the size of a bank as
ESL = aSize2 + bSize+ c.
By taking the first-order derivative, we get that ∂ESL
∂Size
= 2aSize + b. Hence, for Size =
− b
2a
, the partial derivative turns to be zero. In other words, the ESL is neither increasing
nor decreasing with respect to the variation of Size at such a level. With the estimation of
the coefficients a and b as in Table 3 (column 2), we find that this occurs at Size = 11.5.19
By partitioning the sample into two groups at Size = 11.5, we find a significantly
positive relationship for banks with Size < 11.5, while for Size ≥ 11.5 we find a slope
coefficient that is indistinguishable from zero at the 95% confidence level. In other words,
the ESL of banks increase with respect to the size up to a certain size threshold only.
For large banks with Size ≥ 11.5 the TBTF principle does not hold. Quantitatively, the
threshold 11.5 corresponds to a total asset at roughly 100 billion USD. Since the cutoff
point is rather close to the maximum size in the sample, the quadratic relation, in fact,
would be better characterized as a “kink” relation as shown in Figure 1.20
In summary, our empirical analysis confirms that large banks are systemically im-
portant, but only up to a certain size level. After this threshold is surpassed, size alone
cannot differentiate between the degree of systemic importance among those large US
banks. This finding partially supports the validity of the TBTF notion.
We further include other control variables, i.e. the CAMEL ratios, to the regres-
sion alongside Size. The regression results on Size and its quadratic term remain un-
changed in this regression and the regressions below including variables representing non-
traditional banking activities. Hence, the non-linear size-systemic importance relation is
rather robust.
19The Size and Size2 term are constructed from standardized variables in order to remove the po-
tential multi-collinearity problem. as a result, the solution to the above equation had to be transformed
back to the original size using the transformation σSize+ µ.
20Alternatively, we can run a threshold regression to search for a breakpoint that partitions the sample
of banks into two segments. We utilize a test from Hansen (1999) and find a breakpoint, significant at
the 95% confidence level, to be at Size = 9.4. This is close to the 11.5 cutoff point found. We again
partition the sample into two groups at the breakpoint predicted by the threshold test at Size = 9.4. In
this case we find that for Size < 9.4 a significantly positive relation exists, and for banks with Size ≥ 9.4
a positive and significant relation also exists, albeit with a less steep upward curve.
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To test the TNTTF notion, we perform regressions with the variables on money mar-
ket funding and non-interest income generating activities. The initial result is shown in
column 4. None of the variables on non-traditional banking are significant at the 90%
confidence level. We attribute this result to a potential multicollinearity problem. When
considering both size and other variables indicating a bank’s business model, size is re-
lated to other variables in the regression. If the strategies and activities a bank chooses
to undertake have direct impact on how large the bank becomes, the bank size will be
correlated with other variables including the variables describing non-traditional bank-
ing activities. Table 2 shows the correlation matrix among the size variable and other
variables used in the analysis. A high correlation is observed, especially between size and
variables on non-traditional banking. This could potentially overwhelm the size effect or
shield any possible effects that other variables may contribute in determining a bank’s
systemic importance. To avoid such a problem, we orthogonalize the size variable by first
regressing it against the other variables in the regression and then taking the residual
term as a “purified size” variable. By including the purified size variable, the estimated
coefficients on other variables in the regression indicate their actual contribution to sys-
temic importance, though the contribution is potentially via a corresponding large size.
The result is shown in column 5.
Firstly, we observe that the purified size variable is positive and significant, while the
non-interest income variable is also positive and significant at the 99% level. Therefore,
we conclude that the non-interest income activities of a bank play a role in determining
a bank’s systemic importance. By further dividing the non-interest income variable into
two variables indicating trading income and fee and commission income both as a ratio
of total income, we observe that the contribution of non-interest income to systemic
importance is determined by the amount of fee and commission income that a bank
undertakes while the amount of trading income does not appear to be significant.
Secondly, we find the money market funding variable to be positive, yet insignificant
at the 90% confidence level. The fact that we did not observe a significant result on
the money market funding variable is potentially due to the inactivity in the interbank
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payment system during the financial crisis. A key feature of the global financial crisis,
and in fact, a major contributor to the instability, was the inactivity in the interbank
markets. The money market funds during this time were essentially “frozen”. As a result,
how banks rely on the money market funds may not be sufficiently differentiated in the
cross-section. Thus, it may not help to differentiate systemic importance in the cross-
section. We overcome this drawback by including the period preceding the onset of the
crisis in the panel regressions.
Lastly, among the CAMEL ratios, the amount of Tier 1 capital a bank holds in relation
to its risk-weighted assets and total loans as a fraction of assets both negatively associate
to a bank’s systemic importance. Hence, banks with a larger capital buffer prior to the
crisis and with a greater focus on more traditional banking activities (e.g. issuing loans),
are less systemically important during the crisis.
In summary, we have evidence that SIFIs, in addition to being TBTF, also have the po-
tential of being TNTTF. Here non-traditionality refers to relying heavily on non-interest
income generating activities in the form of fee and commission income. In contrast,
a bank operating in a more traditional manner, such as maintaining a healthy capital
buffer and engaging in loan issuing activities, corresponds to a lower level of systemic
importance.
4.2 Panel Regression Results: 2000–2010
We extend our sample of data to a larger horizon starting from the beginning of
200 to the end of 2010. The dataset include eight panels due to the eight overlapping
estimation windows. Table 7 provides descriptive statistics of the ESL estimated in the
eight estimation windows and the potential determinants preceding to these estimation
windows.
The results of the panel regression across the eight panels are shown in Table 5. We
again find that bank size has a non-linear effect on its systemic importance: a positive and
significant coefficient on the size variable while a negative and significant coefficient on
the quadratic size term. The point estimates are close to the ones found in the 2007–2010
17
estimation period which hints that a potential “kink” relation remains. Furthermore, the
purified size also remains significant at the 99% confidence level. To summarize, the
overall effect of size on systemic importance is robust over an extended time period and
smaller sample of banks.
Of the variables indicating non-traditional banking, the non-interest income ratio
remains significant at the 99% confidence level. A key difference in the panel regression
results is that the coefficient on the money market funding variable is now also significant
and positive at the 99% confidence level. This result shows that the non-traditional
activities that determine bank’s systemic importance also include how much banks rely
on non-traditional funding sources.
5 Determinants of Individual Risk: A Comparison
The empirical findings in Section 4 shows that size and non-traditional banking activ-
ities are associated to systemic importance, i.e. TBTF and TNTTF hold. Theoretically
these notations are supported by the diversification argument, see Section 1. Besides in-
creasing systemic importance, a high level of diversification should also leads to low level
of individual risks. Therefore, we expect that all determinants of systemic importance
should have an opposite impact on banks’ individual risk. To further support the theoret-
ical foundation on TBTF and TNNTF, we test how bank business indicators considered
in Section 4 are associated with a measure of individual risk in the cross-section of banks.
The individual risk of a bank is measured from the same equity price data that we
used in the construction of the ESL measure. We consider the heavy-tailed feature of
equity returns by employing univariate EVT to calculate each banks expected shortfall
(ES) on its equity returns. The heavy-tailedness of financial returns is well-documented
in literature, see e.g. Jansen and de Vries (1991) and Embrechts et al. (1997). It shows
that a power law fits the downside tail distribution of the equity return Xi, i.e.
Pr(Xi < −u) ∼ Aiu−αi as u→ +∞.
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Here, the parameters αi is the so-called tail index. From such a parametric expansion of
the tail distribution, Danielsson (2011) provides a derivation to show that if αi > 1
ESi(p) := −E(Xi|Xi < −V aRi(p)) ∼ αi
αi − 1V aRi(p)
Conceptually, the individual risk and the systemic importance are two separate com-
ponents in the systemic risk of a financial institution. We maintain this conceptual
distinction in the construction of the corresponding measures: the ES measure on bank i
is solely calculated from information on bank i, whereas the ESL of bank i uses only the
conditional probability of bank j’s failure given the failure of bank i, with no information
on the individual risk of bank i.
Similar to the estimation of τi,j, the V aRi(p) at the level p = k/n is estimated by
the (k + 1)th highest losses, −Xi,(n−k), where Xi,(n−k) is the (k + 1) lowest return. The
tail index αi is estimated by the Hill estimator from; see Hill (1975). With ranking the
observations Xi,1, · · · , Xi,n, as Xi,(1) ≥ Xi,(2) ≥ · · · ≥ Xi,(n), the Hill estimator is defined
as
1/αˆi :=
1
k
k∑
i=1
log(−Xi,(n−i+1))− log(−Xi,(n−k)).
For the statistical properties of the Hill estimator, see Hill (1975). With the estimation
of the VaR and the tail index, we obtain the estimate of the ES for each bank.
Similar to the analysis in Section 4.2, we run a panel regression by regressing the ES
estimates in eight overlapping estimation windows against the bank business model indi-
cators using time fixed effects. Table 6 reports the results. First, in the regression with
only size, the coefficient on Size is negative and significant at the 99% confidence level
(column 1). For the other regressions including the CAMEL ratios and the variables
on non-traditional banking, we use the purified size variable to avoid potential multi-
collinearity. In the regression including the non-interest income variable, its coefficient
is negative and significant at the 99% confidence level (column 3). By decomposing this
variable into trading income and fee and commission income (column 4), we find that
the coefficient on fee and commission income variable is negative and significant at the
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99% confidence level while that for trading income is insignificant. In the last column, we
also find that the coefficient on money market funding is negative and significant at the
90% confidence level. All these findings provide evidence that being large or engaging in
non-traditional banking reduces the individual risk a bank faces.
In addition, among the CAMEL ratios, the coefficients on Tier 1 capital and loans
as a fraction of total assets are negative and significant at the 99% and 95% confidence
levels, respectively. The coefficient on ROAA is negative but only significant at the 90%
confidence level when excluding the variables on non-traditional activities (column 2).
These results show that more capitalized banks have lower individual risk and banks
that engage mainly in loan issuance are less risky. The latter might be a potential
consequence of the fact that our dataset cover the period of the housing bubble, during
which traditional loan activity was considered less risky by the market.
To summarize, we find that, size and non-traditional banking have an opposite impact
on the individual risk of a bank, compared to that on systemic importance. The same
applies to other indicators on CAMEL ratios. These results provide indirect support on
the diversification theory behind the TBTF and TNTTF notation.
6 Robustness of Results
6.1 Excess Returns vesus Raw Returns
In our main results, we estimate the ESL measure using excess returns net of the mar-
ket risk factor. Recall that the motivation is to avoid measuring systematic co-movement
of equity returns due to the systematic market risk. Nevertheless, the systematic market
risk could well be a reason for systemic risk. In order to alleviate such a concern, we
reconstruct our ESL measures using the raw equity returns and preform the equivalent
analysis as in Section 4.1 (in the 2007–2010 period). The results is shown in Table 7.
Comparing Table 3 with Table 7 we do not find important qualitative difference in the
results. The regression coefficients and significance on the size variables do not exhibit
any qualitative deviations. The same applies to the CAMEL ratios. As an exception, in
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column 5, we find that the negative coefficient on the Tier 1 ratio variable in the original
results is no longer significant. Furthermore, the coefficient on RoAA is positive and
significantly related to the ESL in this analysis at the 90% significance level.
When analyzing the variables on non-traditional banking activities, the only difference
is that the positive coefficient on the non-interest to income ratio variable is no longer
significant. However, when we decompose non-interest income into two variables on
trading income and fee and commission income, we find that the positive coefficient on
the fee and commission to income ratio variable remains significant at the 99% confidence
level.
In summary, our qualitative conclusion do not depend on using raw or excess returns
in the calculation of the ESL measures.
6.2 Alternative proxy of EAD: Total Liabilities
We check the robustness of our results using an alternative proxy of EAD, total
liability of banks. We recalculate the ESL measures with the EAD measured by bank
total liabilities. Furthermore, to check the interaction with the raw return issue raised in
Section 6.1, we calculate the ESL measure using both raw and excess returns with EAD
measured by bank total liabilities. We conduct regressions over the 2007–2010 period as
in Section 4.1 based on all these new ESL measures.
The results can be found in Tables 8 and 9. Comparing with our original results in
Table 3, the only difference we observe is that the coefficient on money market funding
to total funding ratio is positive and significant result at the 95% confidence level; see
Table 8, column 6. This result provides support on our conjecture that a reliance on
money market funding plays a role in determining the systemic importance of banks in
the cross-section. This provides further support rather than rejection to the TNTTF
notion.
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6.3 OLS Regressions in the Period 2000–2010
Our panel regression approach in Section 4.2 has a potential drawback: we do not
allow for variation in the coefficients on the determinants of systemic importance over
time. To overcome this drawback, we thus analyze the eight estimation periods in eight
separate OLS regressions,
Table 10 shows the eight OLS regression results. A general observation is that the
determinants of systemic importance vary over time.
The Purified Size variable is significant in six out of eight periods. It is notable that
the two insignificant periods cover the recent financial crisis during which regulators are
most concerned with identifying SIFIs for making potential bailout decision.
The non-interest income variable is also positive and significant in six of the eight
periods. However, the six periods include all periods covering the financial crisis and
the dot-com collapse. In addition, one of the six periods, 2002–2005, was under benign
economic conditions between the two downturns. Hence, the positive relation between
non-interest income and systemic importance is robust under different macroeconomic
conditions.
The money market funding variable is positive and significant at the 95% confidence
level for most of the periods with the only exceptions being the two neighboring periods:
2002–2005 and 2003–2006. The two periods cover the booming macroeconomic climate
between the dot-com bubble collapse and the financial crisis, whereas the other six periods
contain, at least to some extent, a time during an economic downturn or crisis.
In summary, the variation of potential determinants of systemic importance provides
weak support in favor of the TNTTF principle over the TBTF principle in identifying
SIFIs. The TBTF principle failed the most during the recent financial crisis while the
TNTTF notion holds during both positive and negative economic conditions and was
in particular successful for the recent financial crisis: the variables on non-traditional
banking observed at the end of 2005 and 2006 strongly differentiate banks’ systemic
importance in the coming years.
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7 Conclusion
This paper investigates which bank business model indicator is fundamental in de-
termining bank’s systemic importance. First, we find partial support for the TBTF
hypothesis. However, the relation between size and systemic importance is non-linear.
More specifically, systemic importance is positively related to size only up to a certain
size threshold. For example, as of the end of 2006, US banks with total assets exceeding
100 billion USD are equally systemically important during the crisis period (2007–2010).
Second, we find that systemic importance is also determined by the extent to which a
bank engages in non-traditional banking activities. It is positively related to both the
amount of money market funding and the non-interest income, in particular, the fee and
commission income. In contrast, banks which operate under a traditional manner such
as holding a high level of Tier 1 capital and relying on loan issuing activities have a
low systemic importance. Third, we find that the determinants of systemic importance
may have an opposite effect on the individual riskiness of banks. In other words, banks
that diversify their positions in order to reduce individual risk may at the same time
increase their systemic importance. Lastly, we observe that the determinants of systemic
importance are not time invariant. While the size of a bank is a strong indicator of its
systemic importance before the global financial crisis, non-traditional banking activities
are predominant in periods of economic downturn or crisis.
Our empirical findings have direct policy implications for regulators. First, regulation
that attempts to reduce systemic risk in a financial system must take into account the
size of financial institutions, but only to a limited degree. Once banks become sufficiently
large, their systemic importance can no longer be differentiated by size. In that case, the
systemic impact that the failure of a large bank have on the system has to be differentiated
by analyzing other bank characteristics such as the engagement in non-traditional banking
activities.
Second, if regulators attempt to mitigate the systemic risk of financial institutions by
imposing policies to limit banks’ incentive on risk taking, they should balance the impact
on banks’ individual risk taking and that on enhancing their systemic importance. The
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finding that determinants of the individual risk and the systemic importance may work
against one another suggests that banks may shift their individual risk to the system by
enhancing their systemic importance, for example, by engaging in non-traditional banking
activities. Understanding the determinants of the two components of systemic risk is the
first step in designing effective regulation that may avoid such a double-side effect.
Lastly, macro-prudential regulation that varies according to the macroeconomic envi-
ronment is necessary to maintain the stability of the system. “Flat” regulation that does
not consider macroeconomic environment may provide a sub-optimal solution.
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8 Tables and Figures
Table 1: Summary Statistics: ESL (2007–2010) and potential determinants (2006)
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
ESL 12.588 1.939 6.482 14.655
Size 7.842 1.396 5.464 14.449
Tier 1 Ratio 10.51 4.49 0 24.4
Loans/Assets 70.238 11.719 27.711 92.400
Problem/Loans 0.502 0.589 0 5.984
ROAA 1.097 0.485 -1.54 3.87
Liquid Assets/STF 5.704 5.722 0.74 62.29
MMF/Funding 7.559 8.26 0 77.541
NonInterest/Income 23.478 12.442 -41.632 65.493
Note: This table presents summary statistics for the systemic importance measure, ESL, and other
bank business model indicators. The ESL measure is calculated from excess returns net of the market
index in 2007–2010, see Section 2. The other variables are calculated from 2006 year-end annual bank
balance sheet data. Size refers to the total assets of a bank in (log) million USD with standardized by its
mean and standard deviation. Purified Size is calculated as the residual after regressing size against the
other determinants. Tier 1 Ratio is the total Tier 1 capital divided by the bank’s risk-weighted assets.
Loans/Asset is calculated as the gross loans of a bank divided by its total assets. Problem/Loans is
the total non-performing loans divided by the gross loans of the bank. ROAA is the return on average
assets. Liquid Assets/STF is calculated at the amount of liquid assets a bank holds divided by the
amount of short-term funding the bank has acquired. MMF/Funding is calculated as the total money
market funding divided by total funding. NonInterest/Income is calculated as the amount of non-interest
income as a ratio of total income.
28
Figure 1: ESL vs. Size: 2007–2010
Note: The figure presents a scatter plot of the systemic importance of a bank, as measured by the
logarithm of the ESL, against the logarithm of the size of the bank (total assets in million USD). The
ESL measure is calculated from 2007 to 2010 The ESL measures the expected loss of customer deposits
in the financial system given the distress of a particular bank. The vertical line indicates the estimated
“breakpoint” in the regression above which the size-systemic importance relation is insignificant at the
95% confidence level.
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Table 3: The Determinants of Systemic Importance: 2007–2010
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Size 0.914∗∗∗ 1.367∗∗∗ 1.366∗∗∗ 1.371∗∗∗
(9.39) (10.09) (9.90) (9.46)
Size2 -0.256∗∗∗ -0.282∗∗∗ -0.290∗∗∗
(-6.07) (-5.09) (-5.52)
Purified Size 0.389∗∗∗ 0.361∗∗∗
(9.03) (8.59)
Tier 1 Ratio -0.021 -0.018 -0.117∗∗ -0.100∗
(-0.89) (-0.77) (-2.10) (-1.82)
Loans/Assets -0.009 -0.013 -0.167∗∗ -0.151∗∗
(-0.86) (-1.09) (-2.32) (-2.08)
Problem/Loans -0.307∗ -0.236 -0.029 -0.073
(-1.84) (-1.36) (-0.53) (-1.17)
ROAA -0.129 -0.155 0.070 0.081
(-0.46) (-0.56) (0.95) (1.07)
Liquid Assets/STF 0.013 0.014 -0.034 -0.018
(0.67) (0.76) (-0.65) (-0.33)
MMF/Funding -0.019 0.043 0.066
(-1.40) (0.85) (1.23)
NonInterest/Income 0.009 0.197∗∗∗
(0.90) (3.12)
Trading/Income -0.025
(-0.67)
Fee and Commission/Income 0.166∗∗∗
(3.35)
Observations 311 311 311 311 311 311
R2 0.222 0.280 0.294 0.302 0.246 0.235
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: The dependent variable is the ESL measure calculated from excess returns net of the market index
in 2007–2010, see Section 2. The independent variables are calculated from 2006 year-end annual bank
balance sheet data. Size refers to the total assets of a bank in (log) million USD with standardized by its
mean and standard deviation. Purified Size is calculated as the residual after regressing size against the
other determinants. Tier 1 Ratio is the total Tier 1 capital divided by the bank’s risk-weighted assets.
Loans/Asset is calculated as the gross loans of a bank divided by its total assets. Problem/Loans is
the total non-performing loans divided by the gross loans of the bank. ROAA is the return on average
assets. Liquid Assets/STF is calculated at the amount of liquid assets a bank holds divided by the
amount of short-term funding the bank has acquired. MMF/Funding is calculated as the total money
market funding divided by total funding. NonInterest/Income is calculated as the amount of non-interest
income as a ratio of total income. Trading/Income and Fee and Commission/Income are the trading
income and fee and commission income both as a ratio of total income. The t-statistics are reported in
parentheses.
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Table 4: Summary statistics: ESL (2000–2010) and potential determinants
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
ESL 12.491 1.898 6.758 14.223 143
Size 8.129 1.774 4.758 14.449 143
Tier1 Ratio 11.38 3.634 0 27.2 143
Loans/Assets 67.921 11.667 27.711 87.762 143
Problem/Loans 0.538 0.489 0 2.405 143
ROAA 1.084 0.475 -1.64 2.68 143
Liquid Assets/STF 6.484 7.503 0.99 62.29 143
MMF/Funding 8.386 8.321 0 66.767 143
NonInterest/Income 27.098 12.168 6.151 65.493 143
Note: This table presents summary statistics for the systemic importance measure, ESL, and other bank
business model indicators. The ESL measure is calculated from excess returns net of the market index in
8 moving windows with yearly shifting, from 2000–2003 to 2007–2010, see Section 2. The other variables
are calculated from year-end annual bank balance sheet data in 1999–2006. Size refers to the total assets
of a bank in (log) million USD with standardized by its mean and standard deviation. Purified Size
is calculated as the residual after regressing size against the other determinants. Tier 1 Ratio is the
total Tier 1 capital divided by the bank’s risk-weighted assets. Loans/Asset is calculated as the gross
loans of a bank divided by its total assets. Problem/Loans is the total non-performing loans divided by
the gross loans of the bank. ROAA is the return on average assets. Liquid Assets/STF is calculated
at the amount of liquid assets a bank holds divided by the amount of short-term funding the bank has
acquired. MMF/Funding is calculated as the total money market funding divided by total funding.
NonInterest/Income is calculated as the amount of non-interest income as a ratio of total income.
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Table 5: The Determinants of Systemic Importance: Panel Regression
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Size 0.403∗∗∗ 0.620∗∗∗ 0.610∗∗∗ 0.616∗∗∗
(9.19) (8.74) (8.45) (7.64)
Size2 -0.311∗∗∗ -0.323∗∗∗ -0.324∗∗∗
(-4.85) (-3.99) (-4.07)
Purified Size 0.218∗∗∗ 0.162∗∗∗
(6.37) (4.87)
Tier 1 Ratio 0.065 0.065 0.040 0.037
(1.54) (1.55) (0.80) (0.77)
Loans/Assets 0.088∗ 0.080 0.108∗ 0.105∗
(1.85) (1.51) (1.85) (1.86)
Problem/Loans -0.029 -0.026 0.011 -0.043
(-0.83) (-0.70) (0.42) (-1.20)
ROAA 0.072∗∗ 0.071∗∗ 0.140∗∗∗ 0.167∗∗∗
(2.60) (2.42) (3.21) (4.96)
Liquid Assets/STF 0.052 0.048 0.006 -0.002
(1.19) (1.08) (0.17) (-0.06)
MMF/Funding -0.021 0.150∗∗∗ 0.162∗∗∗
(-0.47) (4.17) (4.68)
NonInterest/Income 0.008 0.135∗∗∗
(0.25) (3.46)
Trading/Income -0.021
(-0.72)
Fee and Commission/Income 0.158∗∗∗
(4.07)
Observations 1125 1125 1125 1125 1125 1125
R2 0.492 0.542 0.557 0.557 0.459 0.464
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: This table presents a panel data regression with time fixed effects. The dependent variable is the
ESL measure calculated from excess returns net of the market index in 8 moving windows with yearly
shifting, from 2000–2003 to 2007–2010, see Section 2. The independent variables are calculated from
1999–2006 year-end annual bank balance sheet data preceding each estimation window. Size refers to
the total assets of a bank in (log) million USD with standardized by its mean and standard deviation.
Purified Size is calculated as the residual after regressing size against the other determinants. Tier 1
Ratio is the total Tier 1 capital divided by the bank’s risk-weighted assets. Loans/Asset is calculated as
the gross loans of a bank divided by its total assets. Problem/Loans is the total non-performing loans
divided by the gross loans of the bank. ROAA is the return on average assets. Liquid Assets/STF is
calculated at the amount of liquid assets a bank holds divided by the amount of short-term funding
the bank has acquired. MMF/Funding is calculated as the total money market funding divided by total
funding. NonInterest/Income is calculated as the amount of non-interest income as a ratio of total income.
Trading/Income and Fee and Commission/Income are the trading income and fee and commission income
both as a ratio of total income. The t-statistics reported in parentheses are calculated with standard
errors clustering at the bank level.
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Table 6: The Determinants of Bank Individual Risk: Panel Regression
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Size -0.274∗∗∗
(-5.38)
Purified Size -0.222∗∗∗ -0.221∗∗∗ -0.167∗∗∗
(-6.98) (-6.78) (-4.45)
Tier 1 Ratio -0.271∗∗∗ -0.293∗∗∗ -0.285∗∗∗
(-5.14) (-5.77) (-5.66)
Loans/Assets -0.112∗∗ -0.142∗∗ -0.139∗∗
(-1.98) (-2.44) (-2.46)
Problem/Loans -0.003 -0.032 0.041
(-0.09) (-0.77) (0.82)
ROAA -0.055∗ -0.007 -0.046
(-1.68) (-0.21) (-1.22)
Liquid Assets/STF -0.035 0.008 0.004
(-0.65) (0.16) (0.07)
MMF/Funding -0.059 -0.078∗
(-1.39) (-1.97)
NonInterest/Income -0.158∗∗∗
(-3.56)
Trading/Income 0.045
(1.37)
Fee and Commission/Income -0.150∗∗∗
(-3.42)
Observations 1144 1144 1144 1144
R2 0.075 0.116 0.142 0.141
Standardized beta coefficients; t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: This table presents a panel data regression with time fixed effects. The dependent variable is
the Expected Shortfall on equity returns in 8 moving windows with yearly shifting, from 2000–2003 to
2007–2010, see Section 2. The independent variables are calculated from 1999–2006 year-end annual
bank balance sheet data preceding each estimation window. Size refers to the total assets of a bank in
(log) million USD with standardized by its mean and standard deviation. Purified Size is calculated as
the residual after regressing size against the other determinants. Tier 1 Ratio is the total Tier 1 capital
divided by the bank’s risk-weighted assets. Loans/Asset is calculated as the gross loans of a bank divided
by its total assets. Problem/Loans is the total non-performing loans divided by the gross loans of the
bank. ROAA is the return on average assets. Liquid Assets/STF is calculated at the amount of liquid
assets a bank holds divided by the amount of short-term funding the bank has acquired. MMF/Funding
is calculated as the total money market funding divided by total funding. NonInterest/Income is cal-
culated as the amount of non-interest income as a ratio of total income. Trading/Income and Fee and
Commission/Income are the trading income and fee and commission income both as a ratio of total
income. The t-statistics reported in parentheses are calculated with standard errors clustering at the
bank level.
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Table 7: The Determinants of Systemic Importance: 2007–2010 (Raw Returns)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Size 0.918∗∗∗ 1.528∗∗∗ 1.425∗∗∗ 1.464∗∗∗
(8.10) (11.28) (11.12) (11.03)
Size2 -0.339∗∗∗ -0.363∗∗∗ -0.358∗∗∗
(-7.67) (-7.87) (-7.80)
Purified Size 0.629∗∗∗ 0.629∗∗∗
(7.84) (7.74)
Tier 1 Ratio 0.001 0.007 0.020 0.031
(0.04) (0.32) (0.87) (1.40)
Loans/Assets -0.012 -0.016∗ -0.030∗∗∗ -0.017∗
(-1.56) (-1.74) (-3.04) (-1.83)
Problem/ Loans -0.066 -0.062 -0.086 -0.077
(-1.11) (-1.07) (-1.43) (-1.27)
ROAA 0.268∗∗ 0.275∗∗ 0.260∗ 0.234∗
(2.01) (2.12) (1.83) (1.67)
Liquid Assets/STF 0.019 0.017 0.013 0.002
(1.52) (1.31) (0.87) (0.11)
MMF/Funding -0.017 0.006 0.021
(-1.27) (0.39) (1.39)
NonInterest/Income -0.006∗ 0.001
(-1.69) (0.30)
Trading/Income 0.036
(0.47)
Fee and Commission/Income 0.061∗∗∗
(5.07)
N 311 311 311 311 311 311
R2 0.223 0.328 0.396 0.402 0.267 0.310
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: The dependent variable is the ESL measure calculated from raw returns in 2007–2010, see Section
2. The independent variables are calculated from 2006 year-end annual bank balance sheet data. Size
refers to the total assets of a bank in (log) million USD with standardized by its mean and standard
deviation. Purified Size is calculated as the residual after regressing size against the other determinants.
Tier 1 Ratio is the total Tier 1 capital divided by the bank’s risk-weighted assets. Loans/Asset is
calculated as the gross loans of a bank divided by its total assets. Problem/Loans is the total non-
performing loans divided by the gross loans of the bank. ROAA is the return on average assets. Liquid
Assets/STF is calculated at the amount of liquid assets a bank holds divided by the amount of short-term
funding the bank has acquired. MMF/Funding is calculated as the total money market funding divided
by total funding. NonInterest/Income is calculated as the amount of non-interest income as a ratio of
total income. Trading/Income and Fee and Commission/Income are the trading income and fee and
commission income both as a ratio of total income. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses.
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Table 8: The Determinants of Systemic Importance: 2007–2010 (Raw Returns with Total Liabilities)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Size 0.926∗∗∗ 1.558∗∗∗ 1.461∗∗∗ 1.477∗∗∗
(8.15) (11.51) (11.03) (10.40)
Size2 -0.358∗∗∗ -0.397∗∗∗ -0.398∗∗∗
(-7.48) (-7.18) (-7.38)
Purified Size 0.670∗∗∗ 0.626∗∗∗
(8.23) (8.37)
Tier 1 Ratio -0.033 -0.032 -0.063∗ -0.055∗
(-1.42) (-1.39) (-2.59) (-2.21)
Loans/Assets -0.025∗∗ -0.027∗∗ -0.044∗∗∗ -0.040∗∗∗
(-3.15) (-3.14) (-4.76) (-4.36)
Problem/Loans -0.206 -0.189 -0.034 -0.17
(-1.37) (-1.18) (-0.20) (-0.89)
ROAA 0.376 0.373 0.827∗∗∗ 0.846∗∗∗
(1.77) (1.71) (3.45) (3.60)
Liquid Assets/STF 0.019 0.019 -0.028 -0.023
(1.12) (1.17) (-1.77) (-1.33)
MMF/Funding -0.007 0.022∗ 0.025∗∗
(-0.61) (2.26) (2.65)
NonInterest/Income 0.000 0.019∗
(0.04) (2.08)
Trading/Income -0.050
(-1.36)
Fee and Commission/Income 0.037∗∗
(3.31)
N 311 311 311 311 311 311
R2 0.228 0.339 0.373 0.374 0.278 0.282
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: The dependent variable is the ESL measure (using total bank liabilities as the weight) calculated
from raw returns in 2007–2010, see Section 2. The independent variables are calculated from 2006
year-end annual bank balance sheet data. Size refers to the total assets of a bank in (log) million USD
with standardized by its mean and standard deviation. Purified Size is calculated as the residual after
regressing size against the other determinants. Tier 1 Ratio is the total Tier 1 capital divided by the
bank’s risk-weighted assets. Loans/Asset is calculated as the gross loans of a bank divided by its total
assets. Problem/Loans is the total non-performing loans divided by the gross loans of the bank. ROAA is
the return on average assets. Liquid Assets/STF is calculated at the amount of liquid assets a bank holds
divided by the amount of short-term funding the bank has acquired. MMF/Funding is calculated as the
total money market funding divided by total funding. NonInterest/Income is calculated as the amount
of non-interest income as a ratio of total income. Trading/Income and Fee and Commission/Income are
the trading income and fee and commission income both as a ratio of total income. The t-statistics are
reported in parentheses.
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Table 9: The Determinants of Systemic Importance: 2007–2010 (Excess Returns with Total Liabilities)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Size 0.749∗∗∗ 1.125∗∗∗ 1.114∗∗∗ 1.127∗∗∗
(9.09) (10.17) (9.79) (9.06)
Size2 -0.213∗∗∗ -0.247∗∗∗ -0.250∗∗∗
(-6.37) (-5.61) (-5.92)
Purified Size 0.558∗∗∗ 0.524∗∗∗
(8.53) (8.03)
Tier 1 Ratio -0.016 -0.014 -0.040 -0.035
(-0.77) (-0.72) (-1.96) (-1.74)
Loans/Assets -0.008 -0.010 -0.023∗ -0.021
(-0.88) (-0.98) (-2.08) (-1.88)
Problem/Loans -0.184 -0.155 -0.039 -0.140
(-1.42) (-1.13) (-0.28) (-0.83)
ROAA -0.044 -0.053 0.304 0.330
(-0.23) (-0.27) (1.46) (1.56)
Liquid Assets/STF 0.020 0.020 -0.003 0.000
(1.33) (1.40) (-0.23) (0.02)
MMF/Funding -0.010 0.015 0.018
(-0.99) (1.55) (1.96)
NonInterest/Income 0.003 0.020∗
(0.32) (2.42)
Trading/Income -0.022
(-0.59)
Fee and Commission/Income 0.030∗
(2.56)
N 311 311 311 311 311 311
R2 0.210 0.266 0.278 0.280 0.224 0.219
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: The dependent variable is the ESL measure (using total bank liabilities as the weight) calculated
from excess returns in 2007–2010, see Section 2. The independent variables are calculated from 2006
year-end annual bank balance sheet data. Size refers to the total assets of a bank in (log) million USD
with standardized by its mean and standard deviation. Purified Size is calculated as the residual after
regressing size against the other determinants. Tier 1 Ratio is the total Tier 1 capital divided by the
bank’s risk-weighted assets. Loans/Asset is calculated as the gross loans of a bank divided by its total
assets. Problem/Loans is the total non-performing loans divided by the gross loans of the bank. ROAA is
the return on average assets. Liquid Assets/STF is calculated at the amount of liquid assets a bank holds
divided by the amount of short-term funding the bank has acquired. MMF/Funding is calculated as the
total money market funding divided by total funding. NonInterest/Income is calculated as the amount
of non-interest income as a ratio of total income. Trading/Income and Fee and Commission/Income are
the trading income and fee and commission income both as a ratio of total income. The t-statistics are
reported in parentheses.
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Table 10: The Determinants of Systemic Importance: Individual Regression
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Purified Size 0.371∗∗∗ 0.492∗∗∗ 0.462∗∗∗ 0.242∗∗∗ 0.256∗∗∗ 0.186∗∗∗ 0.049 -0.026
(5.79) (6.14) (6.19) (3.14) (3.31) (3.03) (0.69) (-0.45)
Tier 1 Ratio 0.143 0.132 0.075 0.085 -0.030 0.130 -0.222∗ -0.183∗
(1.46) (1.38) (0.81) (0.80) (-0.31) (1.10) (-1.96) (-1.67)
Loans/Assets 0.046 0.141 0.166∗ 0.162 0.153 0.034 0.035 0.018
(0.48) (1.34) (1.75) (1.50) (1.41) (0.36) (0.25) (0.13)
Problem/Loans -0.065 0.015 0.098 0.194 -0.096 0.010 0.076 -0.012
(-0.80) (0.23) (1.17) (1.11) (-1.52) (0.11) (1.22) (-0.16)
ROAA 0.008 0.195∗∗ 0.179∗∗ 0.498∗∗∗ 0.243∗∗∗ 0.145∗ 0.164∗ 0.193∗∗
(0.09) (1.99) (2.38) (3.02) (4.05) (1.89) (1.66) (2.14)
Liquid Assets/ STF 0.010 0.021 0.085 0.116 0.017 -0.065 -0.032 -0.068
(0.14) (0.29) (1.08) (0.98) (0.22) (-0.81) (-0.47) (-0.83)
MMF/Funding 0.275∗∗∗ 0.329∗∗∗ 0.109 0.034 0.165∗∗ 0.106∗ 0.189∗∗ 0.185∗∗
(3.37) (4.16) (1.44) (0.43) (2.57) (1.77) (2.30) (2.21)
NonInterest/Income 0.247∗∗∗ 0.090 0.175∗∗ 0.043 0.178∗∗ 0.227∗∗∗ 0.170∗∗ 0.226∗∗
(3.34) (1.00) (2.06) (0.33) (2.48) (2.83) (2.32) (2.14)
Observations 142 139 139 136 142 142 142 143
R2 0.303 0.343 0.329 0.210 0.269 0.152 0.183 0.203
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: This table presents eight cross-sectional regressions indicated by years in the column name. For each regression, the
dependent variable is the ESL measure calculated from excess returns net of the market index in the four-year estimation
window after the indicated year, see Section 2. The independent variables are calculated from year-end annual bank
balance sheet data at the indicated year. Size refers to the total assets of a bank in (log) million USD with standardized
by its mean and standard deviation. Purified Size is calculated as the residual after regressing size against the other
determinants. Tier 1 Ratio is the total Tier 1 capital divided by the bank’s risk-weighted assets. Loans/Asset is calculated
as the gross loans of a bank divided by its total assets. Problem/Loans is the total non-performing loans divided by the
gross loans of the bank. ROAA is the return on average assets. Liquid Assets/STF is calculated at the amount of liquid
assets a bank holds divided by the amount of short-term funding the bank has acquired. MMF/Funding is calculated as
the total money market funding divided by total funding. NonInterest/Income is calculated as the amount of non-interest
income as a ratio of total income. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses.
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